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Abstract
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field IFq of q elements, with
gcd(q, 6) = 1, given by an affine Weierstraß equation. We also use
x(P ) to denote the x-component of a point P = (x(P ), y(P )) ∈ E.
We estimate character sums of the form
N∑
n=1
χ (x(nP )x(nQ)) and
N∑
n1,...,nk=1
ψ
 k∑
j=1
cjx
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
)
on average over all IFq rational points P , Q and R on E, where χ is
a quadratic character, ψ is a nontrivial additive character in IFq and
(c1, . . . , ck) ∈ IF
k
q is a non-zero vector. These bounds confirm several
recent conjectures of D. Jao, D. Jetchev and R. Venkatesan, related
to extracting random bits from various sequences of points on elliptic
curves.
Keywords: Elliptic curves, pseudorandom bits, character sums
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Many standard pseudorandom number generators based on finite fields and
residue rings have proved to be insecure, see [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16].
Partially motivated by this and partially because this is of intrinsic interest
for elliptic curve cryptography, several constructions of pseudorandom gen-
erators from elliptic curves have been proposed, see [18] for a survey of such
constructions and results.
Several new pseudorandom generators from elliptic curves have recently
been suggested by D. Jao, D. Jetchev and R. Venkatesan [13]. Giving a rig-
orous analysis of these constructions is the primal goal of this paper. We also
show how one of the most powerful number theoretic techniques, exponen-
tial and character sums, can be used to address these and similar questions,
which can be of independent interest.
Finally, we note that although elliptic curves provide a very promising
source of cryptographically secure bits, as the recent result of [11] shows,
they also have to be used with great care.
1.2 Results
We fix a finite field IFq of q elements and an elliptic curve E over IFq given
by an affine Weierstraß equation
E : Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (1)
with some a, b ∈ IFq, see [19].
We recall that the set of all points on E forms an Abelian group, with the
point at infinity O as the neutral element, and we use ⊕ to denote the group
operation. As usual we write every point P 6= O on E as P = (x(P ), y(P )).
For P = O we formally write P = (0,∞).
Let E(IFq) denote the set of IFq-rational points on E.
For a positive integer N , points P,Q,R ∈ E(IFq), and a non-zero vector
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c = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ IF
k
q , define character sums of the form
S(P,Q;N) =
N∑
n=1
χ (x(nP )x(nQ)) ,
Tk(c, R;N) =
N∑
n1,...,nk=1
ψ
(
k∑
j=1
cjx
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
))
,
where χ is a quadratic character (we also put χ(0) = 0) and ψ is a nontrivial
additive characters in IFq.
D. Jao, D. Jetchev and R. Venkatesan [13, Conjecture 4.1] have conjec-
tured that there exists a positive constant δ > 0 such that for any N ≥
(log q)2 and any points P 6= Q the bound
S(P,Q;N) = O(N1−δ)
holds. Towards this conjecture, it has been shown in [13, Section 4.2] that
for any point Q ∈ E(IFq),∑
P∈E(IFq)
S(P,Q;N) = O(qN1/2).
This however does not imply that the sums S(P,Q;N) are typically, or even
sometimes, small. Furthermore, the proof given in [13] seems to hold only if
the cardinality #E(IFq) is not divisible by any prime ℓ ≤ N . Here we use a
different argument and estimate the sum
U(N) =
∑
P,Q∈E(IFq)
|S(P,Q;N)|2,
which immediately implies that the sums S(P,Q;N) are small for almost all
pairs of points P,Q ∈ E(IFq).
We also estimate the average value of the sums Tk(c, R;N) over points of
subgroups H ⊆ E(IFq) of order t which is not divisible by any prime ℓ ≤ N .
Namely for a subgroup H of the group of points E(IFq), we estimate the sum
Vk(c,H;N) =
∑
R∈H
|Tk(c, R;N)|
2
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which similarly implies that the sums Tk(c, R;N) are small for almost all
points R ∈ H. Note that subgroups of cryptographic interest are usually
chosen to be of a prime order, so the coprimality condition gcd(N !,#H) = 1
is always satisfied.
In turn, in the case of prime q = p, we derive from our bound on
Vk(c,H;N) that for almost all points R ∈ E(IFq), strings of ℓ least significant
bits of each components of the k-dimensinal points{
x
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
)}k
j=1
, n1, . . . , nk ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (2)
are uniformly distributed (provided that #H is large enough). We note that
instead of strings of most significant bits (as suggested in [13]) we use least
significant bits. This is because for some primes p (for those which are very
close to a power of 2) most significant bits of random residues modulo p are
biased, while least significant bits are always uniformly distributed. A step
towards such a result is made in [13, Proposition 5.1] but it contains some
parameters which are not explicitly estimated in [13] (and as we have just
mentioned it cannot work for most significant bits anyway).
Throughout the paper, the implied constants in symbols ‘O’ and ‘≪’ are
absolute (we recall that U ≪ V and U = O(V ) are both equivalent to the
inequality |U | ≤ cV with some constant c > 0).
Acknowledgements. This work was supported in part by ARC Grant
DP0881473, Australia, (for R.R.F. and I.S.) and by NRF Grant CRP2-2007-
03, Singapore, (for I.S).
2 Preparations
2.1 Backgrounds on division polynomials
For an integer n ≥ 0, let ψn(X, Y ) be the nth division polynomial of E over
IFq given by (1), we refer to [19] for a background on division polynomials.
Let
fn = Xψ
2
n − ψn−1ψn+1 and gn = ψ
2
n, n = 1, 2, . . . . (3)
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In particular, fn and gn are polynomials in IFq[X ] of degrees
deg fn = n
2 and deg gn ≤ n
2 − 1, (4)
such that
x(nP ) =
fn(x(P ))
gn(x(P ))
. (5)
Further, one can write
gn(X) =
{
h2n(X), if n is odd,
(X3 + aX + b)h2n(X), if n is even,
(6)
for some polynomials hn(X) in IFq[X ], n = 1, 2, . . ..
It is well known, and also follows from (5), that the roots of the polynomial
gn, for n ≥ 2, are the x-coordinates of n-torsion points of E, that is, for all
points P in E(IFq) with P 6= O, we have
P = (x, y) ∈ E[n]⇐⇒ gn(x) = 0,
where, as usual,
E[n] =
{
P : P ∈ E(IFq), nP = O
}
.
and IFq denotes the algebraic closure of IFq.
We note that, if gcd(n, q) = 1, then
E[n] ∼= ZZ/nZZ× ZZ/nZZ.
Moreover, if IFq is of characteristic p, then E[p] is isomorphic to ZZ/pZZ or
{O}. We recall that an elliptic curve E is called ordinary if E[p] ∼= ZZ/pZZ.
It is called supersingular if E[p] ∼= {O}. Furthermore, if p divides n, write
n = prn∗ with gcd(p, n∗) = 1. Then
E[n] = E[n∗]⊕ E[p
r],
where E[pr] ∼= ZZ/prZZ if E is ordinary and E[pr] ∼= {O} if E is supersin-
gular. In particular, #E[n] = nn∗ if E is ordinary and #E[n] = n
2
∗ if E is
supersingular.
Denote the set of n-division points of a point Q in E by E[n,Q], that is,
E[n,Q] =
{
P : P ∈ E(IFq), nP = Q
}
.
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Clearly, nP = Q if and only if E[n,Q] = P ⊕ E[n].
The following result shows that the roots of fn are the x-coordinates of
n-division points of a point P0 on E with x(P0) = 0.
Lemma 1. Let E be an elliptic curve over IFq given by the equation (1). Let
P0 = (0, c) ∈ E(IFq), where c is a square root of b. Then, for all x ∈ IFq, we
have fn(x) = 0 if and only if there exist a point P ∈ E[n, P0] with x(P ) = x.
Proof. Let x ∈ IFq. Then, there exists an element y ∈ IFq such that the
point P = (x, y) is a point on E. If fn(x) = 0, then gn(x) 6= 0. Moreover,
from (5), we have x(nP ) = 0. So, nP = P0 or nP = −P0. Thus, nP = P0 or
n(−P ) = P0, that is, either P = (x, y) or −P = (x,−y) is a point of E[n, P0].
If P = (x, y) ∈ E[n, P0], then nP = P0. So, x(nP ) = x(P0) = 0. Next,
from (5), we have fn(x) = 0. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. For all positive integers n = prn∗ with gcd(n∗, p) = 1, we have
fn(X) =
{
f˜n(X)
pr , if E is ordinary,
f˜n(X)
p2r , if E is supersingular,
for some polynomial f˜n in IFq[X ] with deg f˜n = #E[n].
Proof. We note that, for n = prn∗, fn is a polynomial of X
pr if E is ordi-
nary (for example, see [6, Lemma 2]). Moreover, fn is a polynomial of X
p2r
if E is supersingular (for example, see [6]). Recalling (4), we see that if E is
ordinary, one can write fn = f˜n(X)
pr , for some polynomial f˜n in IFq[X ] of
degree prn∗
2. If E is supersingular, then fn = f˜n(X)
p2r , for some polynomial
f˜n in IFq[X ] of degree n∗
2. In other words, deg f˜n = #E[n]. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. If b 6= 0, then for all positive integers n the polynomial f˜n, defined
by Lemma 2, is square-free.
Proof. ¿From Lemma 1, we see that the roots of fn are the x-coordinates of
points of E[n, P0]. Then, from Lemma 2, we also see that the roots of f˜n are
the x-coordinates of points of E[n, P0]. We note that, for P ∈ E[n, P0], the
point −P is in E[n, P0] if and only if P0 = −P0, that is, −P ∈ E[n, P0] if and
only if b = 0. So, if b 6= 0, all points of E[n, P0] have distinct x-coordinates.
We note that, #E[n, P0] = #E[n]. Hence, the polynomial f˜n has #E[n]
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distinct roots. From Lemma 2, deg f˜n = #E[n]. Therefore, if b 6= 0, the
polynomial f˜n is square-free. ⊓⊔
We now define the rational functions
Φm,n(X) =
fm(X)fn(X)
gm(X)gn(X)
,
Ψm,n(X) =
(X3 + aX + b)fm(X)fn(X)
gm(X)gn(X)
.
(7)
We need the following property of Φm,n and Ψm,n, which can be of inde-
pendent interest.
Lemma 4. If E is an ordinary elliptic curve with b 6= 0, then for all distinct
positive integers m and n, neither Φm,n nor Ψm,n is a square of a rational
function in IFq(X).
Proof. From (4) and (6), we see that the difference of deg fn and deg gn is odd.
So, the difference between the degrees of the numerator and denominator of
Ψm,n is odd. So, it cannot be a square of another rational function.
For Φm,n, first, we assume that m + n is even. From (6), we see that
gmgn is a square. Let m = p
rm∗ and n = p
sn∗ with gcd(m∗n∗, p) = 1. By
Lemmas 2 and 3, we write fm = f˜
pr
m and fn = f˜
ps
n , where the polynomials
f˜m, f˜n are square-free. Moreover, deg f˜m = p
rm∗
2 and deg f˜n = p
sn∗
2. So,
for distinct m, n, deg f˜m 6= deg f˜n. Thus, f˜mf˜n can not be a square of a
polynomial in IFq[X ]. The same is true for the product of fm and fn. Hence,
Φm,n can not be a square of a rational function.
Now, we assume that m + n is odd. From (6), we have gmgn = (X
3 +
aX + b)h2mh
2
n. We recall that the roots of X
3 + aX + b are corresponded to
the x-coordinates of points of E[2]. Also, the roots of fm are corresponded
to the x-coordinates of points of E[m,P0]. Clearly the sets E[2] and E[m,P0]
have no common point if b 6= 0. Therefore, X3 + aX + b has no common
root with fm and similarly with fn where b 6= 0. So, again Φm,n can not be
a square of a rational function. ⊓⊔
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2.2 Exponential Sums Along Elliptic Curves
We recall the following bound of character sums with a nontrivial additive
character ψ of IFq, which is given in [17].
Lemma 5. Fix integers 1 ≤ d1 < . . . < ds ≤ D and fix c1, . . . , cs ∈ IFq
with cs 6= 0. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over IFq. Then the
following bound holds:
∑
Q∈H
Q 6=O
ψ
(
s∑
i=1
cix (diQ)
)
= O
(
sD2q1/2
)
,
where H is an arbitrary subgroup of E(IFq) of order t = #H such that
gcd(t, d1 · · · ds) = 1.
3 Main Results
3.1 Sums U(N)
Theorem 6. For a prime power q with gcd(q, 6) = 1 and an ordinary elliptic
curve E given by (1) with b 6= 0, we have
U(N)≪ N6q +Nq2
for every positive integer N .
Proof. Expanding the square and changing the order of summation, we ob-
tain
U(N) =
N∑
m,n=1
∑
P,Q∈E(IFq)
χ (x(mP )x(nP )x(mQ)x(nQ))
=
N∑
m,n=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
P∈E(IFq)
χ (x(mP )x(nP ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
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For n = m, we estimate the inner sum over P trivially as O(q). Thus the
total contribution to U(N) from such terms is
U (=)(N) = O(Nq2). (8)
If n 6= m, as in [13, Section 4.2] we note that any u ∈ IFq appears as
u = x(P ) for some point P ∈ E(IFq) exactly 1 + χ(u
3 + au+ b) times, where
a and b are as in (1). Therefore, using (5), we derive∑
P∈E(IFq)
χ (x(mP )x(nP )) =
∑
u∈IFq
χ (Φm,n(u)) +
∑
u∈IFq
χ (Ψm,n(u)) ,
where the polynomials Φm,n(X) and Ψm,n(X) are given by (7).
Now, by Lemma 4, we see that the Weil bound applies to both sums,
see [12, Theorems 11.23], and together with (4) leads to the estimate∑
P∈E(IFq)
χ (x(mP )x(nP )) = O
(
N2q1/2
)
for n 6= m. Thus the total contribution to U(N) from such terms is
U (6=)(N) = O
(
N2
(
N2q1/2
)2)
= O
(
N6q
)
. (9)
Combining (8) and (9), we finish the proof. ⊓⊔
Clearly, Theorem 6 improves the trivial bound U(N) ≪ N2q2 for N ≤
q1/4−δ with any fixed δ > 0. This is well within the range of interest in [13]
which starts with N of order (log q)2. Furthermore, if N ≤ q1/5 then the
bounds takes the form U(N) ≪ Nq2, thus confirming that for almost all
P,Q ∈ E(IFq) the sums S(P,Q;N) have square root cancellations (see com-
ments after [13, Conjecture 4.1]).
3.2 Sums Vk(c,H;N)
We note that an appropriate version of the results of this section holds for
any q (in fact even without the condition gcd(q, 6) = 1). However, to make
our argument more transparent, we assume that q = p is prime. It is exactly
the case which is needed for our prime goal, which is studying the bit patterns
of the vectors (2).
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Theorem 7. For a prime p, an ordinary elliptic curve E and a subgroup H
of E(IFp) of order t, uniformly over all non-zero vectors c ∈ IF
k
p, we have
Vk(c,H;N)≪ kN
4kp1/2 + kN2k−1t
for all positive integers k and N with gcd(N !, t) = 1.
Proof. Squaring out, expanding and changing the order of summation, we
obtain
Vk(c,H;N) =
N∑
m1,...,nk=1
N∑
n1,...,nk=1∑
R∈H
ψ
(
k∑
j=1
cjx
((
j∏
i=1
mi
)
R
)
−
k∑
j=1
cjx
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
))
.
(10)
For O(kN2k−1) choices of m1, . . . , mk and n1, . . . , nk with at least one
value equal to 1 we estimate the inner sum trivially as t. So the total con-
tribution from such terms is
V1 ≪ kN
2k−1t. (11)
We say that the sequence of integersm1, . . . , mk, n1, . . . , nk ≥ 2 is product
distinct with respect to c the vectors
(m1, m1m2, . . . , m1m2 . . .mk) and (n1, n1n2, . . . , n1n2 . . . nk)
distinct at all positions j for which cj ∈ IF
∗
p.
We see from Lemma 5 that if m1, . . . , mk, n1, . . . , nk ≥ 2 is product dis-
tinct with respect to c then the inner sum over R in (10) is O
(
kN2kp1/2
)
.
Otherwise we estimate this sum trivially as O(t).
The total contribution from these terms is
V2 ≪ kN
4kp1/2 +Mt. (12)
whereM is the number of sequence of integers N ≥ m1, . . . , mk, n1, . . . , nk ≥
2 which are not product distinct with respect to c.
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To estimate M , we assume that cj0 6= 0. If all values of m1, . . . , mk and
all values of n1, . . . , nk, but nj0 are fixed, then nj0 must satisfy the equation
m1 . . . mj0 = n1 . . . nj0
and thus can take at most one possible value. Since j0 takes k distinct values,
the total contribution we getM ≤ kN2k−1 (the vector c = (1, 0, . . . , 0) shows
that this bound cannot be improved). Substituting this bound in (12) we
obtain
V2 ≪ kN
4kp1/2 + kN2k−1t. (13)
Combining (11) and (13), we conclude the proof. ⊓⊔
3.3 Applications
We now address the question of [13] on the distribution of bits of the vec-
tors (2).
Let now q = p be prime. We assume that IFp is represented by the
elements of the set {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
For a point R ∈ E(IFp), positive integers k, ℓ, N and k bit strings
σ1, . . . , σk of length ℓ each, we use Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk) to denote the num-
ber of times the least significant bits of the binary expansions of the compo-
nents of the vectors (2) are σ1, . . . , σk, respectively. It is natural to compare
Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk) with 2
−kℓNk. Thus, for a subgroup H ⊆ E(IFp), we
consider the average deviation ∆k,ℓ(H, N) of Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk) from its
expected value:
∆k,ℓ(H, N) =
∑
R∈H
max
σ1,...,σk
∣∣Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk)− 2−kℓNk∣∣ ,
where the maximum is taken over all 2kℓ choices of k bit strings σ1, . . . , σk of
length ℓ.
Theorem 8. There is an absolute constant C > 0 such that for a prime
p > k, an ordinary curve E and a subgroup H of E(IFp) of order t, uniformly
over all non-zero vectors c ∈ IFkp, we have
∆k,ℓ(H, N) ≤
(
N2kp1/4t1/2 +Nk−1/2t
)
(C log p)k
for all positive integers k, ℓ and N with gcd(N !, t) = 1.
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Proof. Clearly the binary expansion of x ∈ IFp ends with an ℓ-bit string σ
if and only if x = 2ℓy + σ¯, where σ¯ is the integer represented by σ and the
integer y is such that 0 ≤ y < (p− σ¯)/2ℓ. Alternatively, denoting by λ ∈ IFp
the reciprocal of 2ℓ, we obtain
λ(x− σ¯) = y.
We now define
Lj =
⌈
(p− σ¯j)/2
ℓ
⌉
− 1, j = 1, . . . , k.
We also recall the identity
1
p
∑
c∈IFp
ψ(cv) =
{
1, if v = 0,
0, if v ∈ IF∗p.
Therefore, for any fixed nontrivial additive character ψ of IFp, we have
Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk)
=
N∑
n1,...,nk=1
L1∑
y1=0
. . .
Lk∑
yk=0
k∏
j=1
1
p
∑
cj∈IFp
ψ
(
cj
(
λx
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
)
− λσ¯j − yj
))
=
N∑
n1,...,nk=1
L1∑
y1=0
. . .
Lk∑
yk=0
1
pk
∑
c∈IFkp
k∏
j=1
ψ
(
λcjx
((
j∏
i=1
ni
)
R
))
ψ(−λcj σ¯j)ψ(−cjyj)
=
1
pk
∑
c∈IFkp
Tk(λc, R;N)ψ
(
−λ
k∑
j=1
cjσ¯j
)
k∏
j=1
Lj∑
yj=0
ψ (−cjyj) ,
where the outer summation is taken over all vectors c = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ IF
k
p.
Separating the term
(L1 + 1) . . . (Lk + 1)N
k
pk
= 2−kℓNk +O
(
k2−(k−1)ℓNkp−1
)
= 2−kℓNk +O
(
Nkp−1
)
,
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corresponding to the zero-vector c = 0, we obtain∣∣Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk)− 2−kℓNk∣∣
≪ Nkp−1 +
1
pk
∑
c∈IFkp
c6=0
|Tk(λc, R;N)|
k∏
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Lj∑
yj=0
ψ (−cjyj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Furthermore, using that
L∑
y=0
ψ (−cy)≪
p
1 + min{c, p− c}
,
which holds for c ∈ IFp and a positive integer L, see [12, Bound (8.6)], we
derive∣∣Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk)− 2−kℓNk∣∣
≪ Nkp−1 +
∑
c∈IFkp
c6=0
|Tk(λc, R;N)|
k∏
j=1
1
1 + min{cj, p− cj}
.
Since the right hand side of the last expression does not depend on σ1, . . . , σk,
we see that
∆k,ℓ(H, N)≪ N
ktp−1 +
∑
c∈IFkp
c6=0
k∏
j=1
1
1 + min{cj, p− cj}
∑
R∈H
|Tk(λc, R;N)| .
Finally, using the Cauchy inequality and then applying Theorem 7, we obtain
∆k,ℓ(H, N)
≪ Nktp−1 +
∑
c∈IFkp
c6=0
√
tVk(c,H;N)
k∏
j=1
1
1 + min{cj, p− cj}
≪ Nktp−1 +
(
N2kp1/4t1/2 + k1/2Nk−1/2t
) k∏
j=1
∑
cj∈IFp
1
1 + min{cj, p− cj}
.
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We choose C0 such that∑
c∈IFp
1
1 + min{c, p− c}
≤ C0 log p.
Taking C > C0 sufficiently large (to accommodate in C
k all other constants
and also the factor k1/2) we obtain
∆k,ℓ(H, N) ≤
(
N2kp1/4t1/2 +Nktp−1 +Nk−1/2t
)
(C log p)k.
Furthermore, the condition gcd(N !, t) = 1 implies that N < t = O(p) thus
Nktp−1 ≪ Nk−1/2t. Hence the term Nktp−1 can be omitted from the above
bound, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
We recall that in [13], it has been suggested to use the values N =
(log p)O(1). Since cardinalities of elliptic curves of cryptographic interest are
either prime or contain a very small smooth part (that is, a part composed
out of small primes), it is natural to assume that the order t of the largest
subgroup H of E(IFp) with gcd(N !, t) = 1 satisfies t ∼ p
1+o(1). In fact, as-
suming only that t ≥ p1/2+δ for some fixed δ > 0, we see that Theorem 8
is nontrivial provided kℓ = o(logN) and asserts that for almost all points
R ∈ H, strings of ℓ least significant bits of the vectors (2) are uniformly
distributed. That is, for all 2kℓ choices of k bit strings σ1, . . . , σk of length ℓ
for almost all points R ∈ H, the counting function Ak,ℓ(R,N ; σ1, . . . , σk) is
close to its expected value 2−kℓNk.
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